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optimal investments and the resulting eﬃciency of transportation technology
are independent of the relative size of the two countries. On the contrary, in
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Policy implications are also evaluated.
JEL classification: C73, D43, F12, L13, O31.
Keywords: R&D, diﬀerential games, transport and communication costs,
intraindustry trade.
∗Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Strada Maggiore 45, 40125 Bologna, Italy;
email: colombo@spbo.unibo.it.
†Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Strada Maggiore 45, 40125 Bologna, Italy;
email: lamberti@spbo.unibo.it.
‡CORE, Universite´ Catholique de Louvain, 34 voie du Roman Pays, B-1348, Louvain-la-Nueve,
Belgium; and Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Strada Maggiore 45, 40125 Bologna,
Italy; email: mantovan@spbo.unibo.it.
1
1 Introduction
Transport and communication costs are at the heart of many international trade issues
because they put a wedge on transactions across borders. The traditional view is that
national borders aﬀect trade because their existence is associated with discriminatory
policies and physical distance. In this framework distance is not conceived only in
terms of physical space, but it also includes a broad category of features such as
language, diﬀerent legal systems across borders, local consumer tastes, i.e., everything
that may constitute an economic and social impediment for the exporting firm.
Starting from McCallum (1996), recent empirical research on trade reveals a sur-
prisingly high degree of market fragmentation that gives rise to border eﬀects and to
the so-called “home bias” eﬀect. Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000) refers to the home bias
as one of the “six major puzzles in international macroeconomics”. In their view, the
interaction between iceberg transport costs and the elasticity of substitution between
domestic and foreign goods accounts for much of the observed home bias. Anderson
and Marcouiller (1999) propose a diﬀerent explanation for the home bias, relying on
the consideration that the rule of law is much weaker when trade is international.
Along the same line, Turrini and van Ypersele (2002) point out that the home bias
can be explained by diﬀerences in legal systems, so that legal costs are higher when
business is done abroad rather than at home.
Nonetheless, the issue of transport costs has not received suﬃcient attention in
the literature, perhaps because of steadily declining communication and shipment
costs.1 However, the persistence of many home biases confirms that the question of
transport costs is not a secondary one and needs further and deeper investigations.
In this paper, we analyze the strategic behavior of firms located in diﬀerent coun-
tries that open up to trade and face an additional cost when delivering abroad. As a
stylized fact, firms that export their goods abroad face costs that are not only due to
1Harley (1980) and O’Rourke and Williamson (1999) document the sharp declines in both ocean
and overland transportation costs.
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physical distance, but also to the access to a foreign network of communication and
distribution. Hence, they might be willing to invest in transport and communication
technology to increase the penetration into foreign markets.
We consider a duopoly Cournot game with firms facing the possibility of investing
in transport and communication R&D (TCRD). By investing in TCRD, a firm may
have an easier access to the foreign market, thus increasing her market share. As
usual, transport and communication costs are of the ‘iceberg’ form introduced in the
literature by Samuelson (1954) and widely used in trade theory thereafter.
Both the open-loop and the closed-loop equilibria are investigated.2 In the former,
the resulting steady state investment eﬀorts and the eﬃciency levels of transportation
technologies depend only upon time discounting, depreciation and the eﬃciency of
TCRD. This is due to the fact that, in the open-loop setting, firms design an invest-
ment plan at the outset and stick to it until they reach the steady state, regardless
of the strategic interaction taking place in between. Accordingly, the relative size
of the two countries does not influence the investment behaviour and the resulting
performance of firms’ transportation technologies at equilibrium. On the contrary, in
the closed-loop equilibrium firms explicitly account for strategic interaction through
reciprocal feedback eﬀects at any point in time. This yields optimal investment ef-
forts and equilibrium technologies that do depend upon the relative size of the two
markets. In particular, each firm’s optimal investment path toward the equilibrium
is positively aﬀected by the size of the foreign country, all else equal. This can be
labelled as a ‘foreign market eﬀect’, for the sake of contrasting this finding with the
well known ‘home market eﬀect’ whereby a firm located in the larger market sells
more than the firm located in the smaller market (see Krugman, 1990, inter alia).
When firms only control sales in order to maximise profits, then, intuitively, market
shares on the international market place go along with the relative size of countries.
2For an introduction to diﬀerential oligopoly games, see Cellini and Lambertini (2003). For a
more detailed treatment of diﬀerential game theory, see Dockner et al. (2000).
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However, if firms are required or allowed to endogenously determine their respective
ability to reach the foreign market, then the size of the latter may matter more than
the size of the home market.
On the other hand, we find that the larger is the home market, the lower will
be the eﬃciency of the transportation technology employed by a firm in the closed-
loop steady state equilibrium. This reveals the presence of a ‘home market eﬀect’
operating at equilibrium. This can be interpreted in the usual sense, as the funds for
R&D activities are raised by sales, which in turn are positively aﬀected by the size
of the domestic country.
A domestic policy maker aiming at improving his country’s social welfare may
adopt two alternative measures (or a combination of both). He may modify either
the instantaneous cost of investment, or the eﬃciency of the R&D technology, through
subsidies or taxation. In both cases, a taxation policy should be adopted so as to
reduce excess investment characterising the closed-loop equilibrium.3
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The setup is laid out in
section 2. Open-loop and closed-loop equilibria are investigated in section 3. Section
4 analyses policy implications. Concluding remarks are given in section 5.
2 The model
We consider a model of bilateral trade between two firms selling a homogeneous good.
We assume that firm i is located in country A while firm j is located in country B.
Market competition takes place as a Cournot game where each firm chooses the profit
maximizing quantity for each country separately (Brander, 1981). Time is continuous
and denoted by t, with t ∈ (0,∞).
Firms face an additional transport cost only when shipping the final good abroad.
3This phenomenon is widely accounted for in the literature since Brander and Spencer (1983).
We don’t dwell upon the possibility for a policy maker to adopt tariﬀs or quotas, in view of the
recent guidelines of GATT and WTO.
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This amounts to saying that transport costs only aﬀect international trade. We model
transportation costs as in Samuelson (1954), i.e. using the iceberg metaphor.
Consider the following indirect demand system:
pA(t) = aA − qiA(t)−
qjA(t)
sj (t)
(1)
pB(t) = aB − qjB(t)−
qiB(t)
si (t)
(2)
where qiA(t) (qjB(t)) denotes the quantity produced by firm i (j) for domestic con-
sumption and qjA(t) (qiB(t)) represents the quantity produced by firm j (i) for foreign
consumption;
qjA (t)
sj (t)
, with sj (t) > 1 ∀t ∈ [0,∞), represents the share of firm j’s
good that arrives in country A at time t, and similarly for
qiB(t)
si (t)
. Finally, aA and aB
stand for market-sizes, both supposed to be constant over time.
On the supply side, production exhibits constant return to scale. For the sake of
simplicity, we normalize unit costs to zero. Instantaneous profits are then given by:
πi(t) = pA(t) qiA(t) + pB(t)
qiB(t)
si (t)
− β [ki(t)]2 (3)
πj(t) = pB(t) qjB(t) + pA(t)
qjA(t)
sj (t)
− β [kj(t)]2 (4)
where ki(t) and kj(t), respectively, represent the amount of eﬀort made by firm i
and firm j at time t in order to reduce the percentage of quantity lost on the way.
Parameter β > 0 is an inverse measure of TCRD productivity.
As a result of such activities, each firm increases the fraction of good that reaches
foreign market. We assume that si (t) and sj (t) evolve over time according to the
following kinematic equations:
·si (t) =
∂si(t)
∂t
= [αki(t)− δsi(t)] [1− si(t)] (5)
·sj (t) =
∂sj(t)
∂t
= [αkj(t)− δsj(t)] [1− sj(t)] (6)
where δ ∈ [0, 1] denotes the depreciation rate, which is common to both firms and con-
stant over time; α > 0 is a constant parameter positively aﬀecting the accumulation
process.
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We assume that firm i aims at maximizing the discounted profit flow:
Πi(t) =
Z ∞
0
πi(t) e−ρtdt (7)
w.r.t. controls ki(t) and the market variables qiA (t) and qiB (t), under the constraint
given by the state dynamics (5). Firm j follows a specular dynamic optimization
program. The discount rate ρ > 0 is assumed to be constant and common to both
firms.
3 Solution of the Game
The current value Hamiltonian function for firm i writes:
Hi = e−ρt
n
πi(t) + λii(t)
·si (t) + λij(t)
·sj (t)
o
dt (8)
where λii(t) = µii(t)eρt and λij(t) = µij(t)eρt, µii(t) being the co-state variable asso-
ciated to si(t). Firms play simultaneously. Firm i’s first order conditions (FOCs) on
controls are:4
∂Hi
∂qiI
= 0⇒ qiI =
1
2
µ
aI −
qjI
sj
¶
; I = A,B (9)
∂Hi
∂qiJ
= 0⇒ qiJ =
si
2
(aJ − qjJ) ; J = A,B (10)
∂Hi
∂ki
= 0⇒ λii =
2βki
α (1− si)
(11)
along with the transversality and initial conditions:
lim
t→∞
µiisi = 0, si(0) > 1. (12)
Note that the above FOCs do not contain λij, therefore we set λij = 0 for all
t ∈ [0,∞). Moreover, (9) contains sj, i.e., the state variable of the rival, meaning
that the open-loop solution and the closed-loop memoryless solution do not coincide.
Consequently, we deal with the two solution concepts.
4For the sake of brevity, in the remainder we omit the indication of time as well as exponential
discounting.
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3.1 Open-Loop Nash Equilibrium
The outcome of the open-loop game is summarised by the following:
Proposition 1 The open-loop game reaches a unique steady state at:
kOLi =
ρ+ δ
α
; sOLi =
ρ+ δ
δ
.
The equilibrium
©
kOLi , sOLi
ª
is a saddle point.
Proof. Under the open-loop solution concept, we can specify the firm i’s co-state
equation as follows:
−∂Hi
∂si
=
.
λii − ρλii ⇔ (13)
.
λii =
qiJ [si (aJ − qjJ)− 2qiJ ] + λii [ρ+ αki − δ (2si − 1)] s3i
s3i
.
Now, by using (11), one obtains the dynamics of investment:
.
ki =
α
2β
h .
λii (1− si)− λii
.si
i
(14)
which can be simplified by using the co-state equation (13) and the system (9-10):
.
ki = ki (ρ+ δ − δsi) (15)
The steady state equilibrium requires
n .
ki = 0,
.si = 0
o
, yielding:
kOLi =
ρ+ δ
α
; sOLi =
ρ+ δ
δ
(16)
Since under open-loop solution concept, by definition, feedback eﬀects are not ac-
counted for, the equilibria we find are such that the size of the country does not play
any role. Indeed, kOLi and sOLi depend only upon intertemporal parameters.5
As to the issue of stability, on the basis of symmetry, we can look at a single
firm in isolation. Using the two diﬀerential equations (5) and (15), we can write the
Jacobian matrix of firm i:
5This can be shown to hold as well in a similar setup without trade (see Colombo, Lambertini
and Mantovani, 2003).
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JOL =


∂ ·si
∂si
∂ ·si
∂ki
∂
·
ki
∂si
∂
·
ki
∂ki

 =

 −δ + 2δsi − αki α (1− si)
−δki ρ+ δ − δsi


The trace and determinants of JOL are:
Tr
¡
JOL
¢
= ρ+ 1− δ > 0
∆
¡
JOL
¢
= ρδ (2si − 1)− αρki + δ2 [si (3− 2si)− 1]
which, evaluated at
©
kOLi , sOLi
ª
, simplifies as follows:
∆
¡
JOL
¢
= −ρ (ρ+ δ) < 0.
This concludes the proof.
Equilibrium outputs are:
qOLiA =
aA
3
; qOLiB =
aBsOLi
3
=
aB (ρ+ δ)
3δ
;
qOLjA =
aAsOLj
3
=
aA (ρ+ δ)
3δ
; qOLjB =
aB
3
;
(17)
while profits are:
πOLi =
a2A + a2B
9
− β (ρ+ δ)
2
α2
> 0 iﬀ
a2A + a2B
9
>
β (ρ+ δ)2
α2
. (18)
3.2 Closed-Loop Nash Equilibrium
Here we take into account the feedback between player i’s strategy and player j’s
state variable. This will lead to an equilibrium characterized by subgame perfection.
We specify the firm i’s co-state equation:
−∂Hi
∂si
− ∂Hi
∂qjJ
∂q∗jJ
∂si
=
.
λii − ρλii (19)
along with the transversality and initial conditions:
lim
t→∞
µiisi = 0, si(0) > 1. (20)
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The partial derivatives appearing in (19) are:
∂Hi
∂si
=
2q2iJ − qiJ (aJ − qjJ) si + λii [(2si − 1) δ − αki] s3i
s3i
(21)
∂Hi
∂qjJ
= −qiJ
si
;
∂q∗jJ
∂si
=
qiJ
2s2i
(22)
Optimal output levels are as in (17), i.e., qCLiI = aI/3 and qCLiJ = aJsCLi /3. Now,
by using (14), (17) and the co-state equation (19), we can write:
.
ki =
36βkisi (ρ− δsi + δ)− a2j (si − 1)α
36βsi
(23)
However, steady state solutions are cumbersome, therefore they cannot be intu-
itively interpreted. Hence, we proceed as follows. We impose
.
ki = 0 to determine an
equilibrium relation between ki and si:
kCLi (si) =
a2J (si − 1)α
36βsi [ρ− δ (si − 1)]
(24)
Notice that, here, steady state expressions involve the size of the countries as well
as parameter β, unlike what we have observed in the previous section, treating the
open-loop solution. Indeed, kOLi and sOLi depend only on intertemporal parameters,
while kCLi and therefore also sCLi are explicitly aﬀected by the size of the foreign
market as well as the eﬃciency of R&D activity, as (inversely) measured by the
cost parameter β. This clearly reflects the fact that the closed-loop solution conveys
more information than the open-loop one, by explicitly taking into account the rival’s
reaction.
The following can be shown to hold:
Proposition 2 The steady state defined by {
.
ki = 0,
.si = 0} is a saddle point.
Proof. See the Appendix. ¥
An intuitive illustration of saddle point stability can be obtained from the phase
diagram of firm i, as it is described in Figure 1.
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Figure 1 : The phase diagram for firm i
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Some intuitive comparative statics can be carried out on kCLi (si) :
∂kCLi (si)
∂α
> 0 ;
∂kCLi (si)
∂β
< 0 . (25)
More interesting is the following:
∂kCLi (si)
∂aJ
> 0 (26)
which tells that the locus of the optimal investment shifts upwards with the size of
the foreign market. We can label this as the foreign market eﬀect: the larger is the
foreign market, the higher is the incentive to carry out R&D activity to improve the
eﬃciency of transportation, for any given level of the iceberg cost si. However, we
are about to show that, in equilibrium, any upward shift of the locus
.
ki = 0 brings
about a decrease in the steady state investment, due to the shape of
.si = 0.
Moreover, from (24), we also draw the following implication:
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Lemma 3 The condition si = sj, is suﬃcient to ensure that, along the path to the
steady state, kCLi > kCLj for all aI < aJ , and conversely.
The eﬀect of si on kCLi (si) is also relevant:
∂kCLi (si)
∂si
=
a2J
£
ρ+ δ (si − 1)2
¤
α
36βs2i [ρ− δ (si − 1)]
2 > 0 ,
which proves the following:
Lemma 4 The locus of the optimal investment in TCRD, kCLi (si) , shifts upwards
for any given increase in si.
This is due to the fact that, the smaller is the fraction of exports that can actually
reach the foreign market, the higher is the incentive for firm i to invest in order to
improve the eﬃciency of the transportation technology.
We are now in a position to derive the implicit profit levels (for a given level of si)
under the closed-loop solution concept. Before doing this, from a direct comparison
between (16) and (24), it is easy to prove that the optimal eﬀort in TCRD is higher
under the closed-loop than under the open-loop solution (see Colombo, Lambertini
and Mantovani, 2003).
This result is in line with the kind of R&D activity at stake, which aims at increas-
ing the percentage of output that reaches the foreign market. Moreover, we confirm
the conventional wisdom that firms invest more when using closed-loop decision rules
than open-loop ones (see, e.g., Reynolds, 1987).
The steady state profits accruing to firm i are:
πCLi (si) =
a2I + a2J
9
− a
4
J (si − 1)
2 α2
1296βs2i [ρ− δ (si − 1)]
2 (27)
Proposition 5 If aI ≥ aJ then sCLi > sCLj and kCLi > kCLj .
Proof. First, we plug kCLi (si) into
.si and impose
.si = 0, to get:
sCLi =
ρ+ δ
3δ
+
3βδ2Ψ+ 3
r³
Φ+
√
3Θ
´2
18βδ2 3
p
Φ+
√
3Θ
(28)
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where:
Ψ ≡ 12β (ρ+ δ)2 − α2a2J
Φ ≡ 27β2δ3
£
8β (ρ+ δ)3 − α2a2J (ρ− 2δ)
¤
Θ ≡ β3δ6
n
27β
£
8β (ρ+ δ)3 − α2a2J (ρ− 2δ)
¤2 − £12β (ρ+ δ)2 − α2a2J¤3o .
Now it can be checked that sCLi = sCLj at aI = aJ , while sCLi > sCLj for all aI >
aJ (and conversely). Then, from (5-6), notice that one can write kCLi = δsCLi /α.
Therefore, if sCLi > sCLj , then it must be true that kCLi > kCLj . ¥
The above proposition states that, in steady state, the firm located in the larger
country has a comparatively higher incentive to invest in TCRD than the firm located
in the smaller country. We label this as the home market eﬀect. While the foreign
market eﬀect outlined above matters along the path to the steady state, the home
market eﬀect emerges in steady state only. The explanation is the following. Along
the optimal investment path, the firm focusses its eﬀorts upon the attempt to improve
its ability to export, i.e., what matters is the size of the other country. This is
represented by the fact that kCLi (si) is a function of aJ but not of aI . In steady
state, firms only invest in order to preserve the equilibrium, i.e., the status quo.
In this situation, firm i’s ability to invest so as to make up for the depreciation rate
ultimately depends upon its capacity to raise resources to finance R&D activity. This
is essentially determined by its domestic market. In this sense, the features of the
steady state equilibrium recall the well known home eﬀect already highlighted in the
existing literature (Helpman and Krugman, 1985; Krugman, 1990).
The foregoing analysis can be described graphically, by referring to Figure 2.
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Figure 2 : The phase diagram drawn for aI > aJ
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In the figure, we assume aI > aJ , so that the locus
.
ki = 0 lies everywhere to
the right of
.
kj = 0, and below it. then, note that a unique locus
.si = 0 appears,
in that the parameters aﬀecting the state dynamics are fully symmetric across firms.
Therefore, the inequality aI > aJ directly implies both kCLi > kCLj and sCLi > sCLj .
4 Policy Implications at the Closed-Loop Equilib-
rium
The social welfare enjoyed by country I in the steady state associated with the closed-
loop equilibrium is:
SWCLI = πCLi + CSCLI (29)
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where CSCLI is the instantaneous consumer surplus:
CSCLI =
£
aI − pCLi
¤
2
·
"
qCLiI +
qCLjI
sj
#
=
2a2I
9
(30)
and πCLi is given by (27). Therefore, welfare can be written for a generic si, as follows:
SWCLI (si) =
a2I
3
+
a2j
9
− a
4
J (si − 1)
2 α2
1296βs2i [ρ− δ (si − 1)]
2
We want to investigate the responses of SWCLI (si) to diﬀerent policy measures.
Assume that the government of country I may choose between two kinds of policies:
(i) an R&D subsidy to aﬀect the instantaneous investment costs, through a reduction
of β; (ii) an R&D subsidy aﬀecting the accumulation process, through an increase of
α. Consider, first, policy (i). Its marginal eﬀect on welfare is given by:
∂SWCLI (si)
∂β
=
a4J (si − 1)
2 α2
1296β2s2i [ρ− δ (si − 1)]
2 > 0 (31)
Therefore, a marginal increase in β improves welfare. This can be explained as follows.
An increase in β reduces kCLi (si) , as we know from (25). This suggests that firms
invest too much in R&D as compared to what would be socially optimal, given the
output levels chosen on the basis of profit maximisation.
As to policy (ii), its eﬀect is given by:
∂SWCLI (si)
∂α
= − a
4
J (si − 1)
2 α
648βs2i [ρ− δ (si − 1)]
2 < 0 (32)
Likewise, a marginal decrease in α yields a welfare improvement, since it slows down
the R&D investment.
In line of principle, the two measures could obviously be implemented together.
However, this may not be possible. In order to understand which one should be
preferred, we consider the following:¯¯¯¯
∂WCLI (si)
∂α
¯¯¯¯
=
2β
α
¯¯¯¯
∂WCLI (si)
∂β
¯¯¯¯
(33)
It is immediate to draw from it:
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Proposition 6 For all β > α/2, it is preferable to reduce the investment eﬀorts of
firms by reducing the productive eﬃciency of R&D activity, rather than increasing
the cost of R&D investment, and vice versa.
That is, a welfare-improving reduction of excess investment typically emerging
in Cournot markets (as in Brander and Spencer, 1983; Spencer and Brander, 1983),
can be attained through several forms of taxation, aﬀecting either the perceived cost
of R&D activity to be accounted for in instantaneous profits (parameter β), or the
performance of R&D activity itself (parameter α).
5 Concluding remarks
We have analysed a dynamic Cournot duopoly with intraindustry trade, where firms
invest so as to reduce the level of iceberg transportation costs. We have derived both
open-loop and closed-loop equilibria, showing that a unique (saddle point) steady
state exists in both cases. In the open-loop model, optimal investments and the
resulting eﬃciency of transportation technology are independent of the relative size
of the two countries. On the contrary, in the closed-loop case, a home market eﬀect
operates so that the firm located in the larger country invests more than the rival
located in the smaller one.
In order to reduce the excessive amount of R&D eﬀort by the domestic firm, a
policy maker aiming at enhancing domestic social welfare may adopt two diﬀerent
types of R&D taxation, or a mix thereof.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. The dynamic system is described by the following diﬀer-
ential equations:
.
ki =
36βkisi (ρ− δsi + δ)− a2j (si − 1)α
36βsi
(a1)
·si =
∂si(t)
∂t
= [αki − δsi] [1− si] (a2)
yielding the Jacobian matrix for the closed-loop case:
JCL =


∂
.
ki
∂ki
∂
.
ki
∂si
∂ .si
∂ki
∂ .si
∂si

 =


ρ− δsi + δ −
36βkis2i δ + a2jα
36βs2i
−α (si − 1) −δ + 2δsi − αki

 (a3)
The determinant of JCL is:
∆
¡
JCL
¢
= −
36βs2i
¡
ρδ − 2siρδ + ραki − 3siδ2 + 2s2i δ2 + δ2
¢
+ a2jα2 (si − 1)
36βs2i
(a4)
and
©
kCLi , sCLi
ª
is a saddle point if ∆
¡
JCL
¢
< 0. Now, from (24), one can plug
kCLi (si) into (a4) to obtain:
∆
¡
JCL
¢
= −
α2a2j (ρ+ δ) (si − 1)
2 − 36βδs2i (2si − 1) (ρ+ δ − δsi)
2
ρ+ δ − δsi
. (a5)
The non-negativity of (24) requires si < (ρ+ δ) /δ, i.e., the open-loop solution for si.
Therefore, in general, we can write:
si =
ρ+ δ − ε
δ
, (a6)
where ε is positive and small. In correspondence of (a6), the determinant rewrites as:
∆
¡
JCL
¢
= −
α2a2j (ρ+ δ) (ε− ρ)
2 − 36βε2 (ρ+ δ − ε) (2ρ+ δ − 2ε)
δ2
(a7)
with
lim
ε→0
= −
α2a2j (ρ+ δ) ρ2
δ2
< 0 (a8)
which proves that, in the left neighbourhood of the open-loop solution for si, the
closed-loop equilibrium is a saddle point. Alternatively, one can plug (28) into (a5)
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and give plausible numerical values to (aj, α, β) , to verify that ∆
¡
JCL
¢
< 0 for all
δ, ρ ∈ [0, 1] .
Concerning the second order conditions, we apply Arrow’s suﬃciency theorem
(1968); see also Chiang (1992, ch. 8). The Hessian matrix of firm i is:
Hi =


λii
2
µ
α2λii
b
+ 4δ
¶
0
0
α2λijλjj
b
+ 2λijδ

 (a9)
Since the determinant of the above 2 × 2matrix is positive, the matrix is negative
definite. Hence, second order conditions are satisfied.
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